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(DON’T) TAKE ANOTHER LITTLE PIECE
OF MY IMMUNITY, BABY: THE APPLICATION
OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES TO CLAIMS OF
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Daniel P. Roy III*
This Note examines the split among the federal circuit courts regarding
the application of agency principles to claims of foreign sovereign
immunity. Specifically, a minority of courts have applied the doctrine of
apparent authority in determining whether a sovereign is bound by the acts
of its agents. The majority of courts have, however, declined to apply the
doctrine, holding that only actual authority is sufficient to bind sovereigns
to their agents’ acts. This Note examines the policy ramifications of the
minority view through the lens of sovereign debt litigation, especially those
conducted by so-called vulture funds, and ultimately concludes that the
minority view should be explicitly disregarded via congressional revision of
the statutory scheme governing claims of foreign sovereign immunity.
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INTRODUCTION
In November of 1983, Loydstone Jacobs, the Antiguan Ambassador to
the United Nations (UN), signed a $250,000 loan agreement with First
National State Bank of New Jersey, ostensibly to renovate the Antiguan
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Permanent Mission.1 Rather than make any improvements, he sunk the
money into a (seemingly ill-fated) casino venture, in which, perhaps not
coincidentally, a number of Antiguan government officials were
coinvestors.2 After payment on the loan ceased in mid-1985 and settlement
negotiations failed, the noteholder, First Fidelity Bank, sued in the Southern
District of New York and obtained a default judgment against the Antiguan
Government.3
Shortly after First Fidelity tried to collect against Antiguan bank accounts
in the United States,4 Jacobs agreed to settle the dispute.5 But First Fidelity
was paid only a fraction of what it was owed under the settlement,6 and the
bank reinitiated its efforts to attach the Antiguan bank accounts.7 In
response, the Antiguan Government challenged the original default
judgment on the basis of foreign sovereign immunity.8 It argued that, under
Antiguan law, Jacobs lacked authority to borrow the $250,000 and to waive
its sovereign immunity.9 The district court disagreed: agency principles
made Antigua liable for Jacobs’s acts.10 Antigua appealed to the Second
Circuit.11
While the Second Circuit declined to reach the merits in First Fidelity
Bank v. Government of Antigua and Barbuda,12 it held that a sovereign may
be bound to a commercial transaction where its agent acts with apparent
authority.13 Other circuit courts, including the Ninth,14 Fourth,15 and
Fifth,16 reject this position. They hold that a sovereign is bound to a
commercial agreement only where its agent acts with actual authority.17

1. First Fidelity Bank v. Gov’t of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189, 191 (2d Cir.
1989).
2. Id. at 197 (Newman, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 191 (majority opinion).
4. Id.
5. Id. This settlement agreement contained a complete waiver of sovereign immunity.
Id. Jacobs claimed that the Permanent Secretary to the Antiguan Prime Minister had
previously authorized him to enter into such a settlement agreement. Id. Thus, Jacobs signed
the agreement in his capacity as Ambassador, while Robert Healy, in-house counsel for the
Antiguan Permanent Mission to the UN, signed as the government’s attorney. Id. Antigua
denied that Jacobs and Healy were ever authorized to enter into such an agreement. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. This was the first official action taken by the Antiguan Government in the course
of the litigation. Id.
9. Id. at 197 (Newman, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 191 (majority opinion).
11. Id.
12. 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989). The court vacated the prior default judgment and
remanded the case to the district court for further factual proceedings consonant with its
rulemaking. Id. at 196.
13. See id. at 193–95.
14. Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997).
15. Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2004).
16. Dale v. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2006).
17. Id. at 428–30; Velasco, 370 F.3d at 400; Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 307–08.
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The ramifications of this circuit split are manifold. For example,
sovereign debt litigation over agreements with highly indebted states18 or
with authoritarian regimes frequently turn on the decision to apply actual or
apparent authority doctrine.19 The minority position would extend liability
to sovereigns via the doctrine of apparent authority and produce judgments
with catastrophic economic effects for many troubled states.20 Moreover, it
would have disconcerting doctrinal implications21 and threaten U.S. foreign
policy goals.22 In contrast, the majority position would result in greater
predictability of decisions, as well as the preservation of foreign sovereign
immunity.23 It would, however, function to the detriment of contractual
sanctity and global creditors.24
Part I of this Note examines the bedrock principles of agency law, the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, and how the two areas of law
intersect. Part II then analyzes how courts apply these principles by
explicating the methodologies and justifications for adopting the minority
or majority position.
Part III considers the doctrinal and policy
ramifications of the minority and majority positions and ultimately proposes
that Congress remedy the split via revision of the current statutory scheme.
Absent congressional action, this Note proposes a judicial remedy.
I. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?: AGENCY PRINCIPALS,
THE DOCTRINE OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY,
AND THEIR INTERSECTION
This Note begins, in Part I.A, by examining the general principles of
agency law implicated in this circuit split. Part I.B then addresses the
historical development of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, up to
and including the codification of the modern standard in the form of the
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). In turn, Part I.C focuses
specifically on the FSIA’s commercial activity exception, illustrating how
commercial transactions may affect claims of sovereign immunity in U.S.
courts. Lastly, Part I.D demonstrates how the agency principles identified
in Part I.A are applied in the foreign sovereign immunity claims discussed
in Parts I.B and I.C, particularly in the context of sovereign debt litigation.
18. See, e.g., Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo (Themis Capital I),
881 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (centering on the renewal of a debt restructuring
agreement by government officials of the Democratic Republic of Congo).
19. See, e.g., Velasco, 370 F.3d at 392 (involving the issuance of promissory notes by an
organ of the Indonesian security apparatus under the Suharto dictatorship).
20. See Elizabeth Broomfield, Subduing the Vultures: Assessing Government Caps on
Recovery in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 473, 493–94
(highlighting the impact of vulture fund litigation on Liberia, a politically and economically
troubled African state that was ordered to pay a sum equivalent to 5 percent of its 2009
annual budget to two funds by a British court).
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra Part III.A–B.
24. See Daniel E. Murray, Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir.
1997), 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 738, 739 (1997) (discussing the problematic nature of the Ninth
Circuit’s refusal to apply the doctrine of apparent authority).
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A. Agency Principles
Part I.A.1 of this Note examines general principles of agency law,
including how agency relationships are formed and the duties of the actors
involved. Having reviewed these foundational principles, Part I.A.2
investigates how agents bind third parties to their actions, specifically via
the doctrines of actual and apparent authority. Finally, Part I.A.3 surveys
equitable doctrines relating to the binding power of agents, specifically the
doctrine of inherent authority and the more modern doctrine of agency by
estoppel.
1. The Agency Relationship
The term “agency” refers to the fiduciary relationship wherein one party
empowers another party to transact some business on its behalf.25 This
relationship, also known as the principal-agent relationship, is essentially
consensual.26 It is created when one individual or entity (the principal)
manifests assent that another individual or entity (the agent) shall act on the
principal’s behalf and remain subject to his control, and the agent manifests
his assent to that arrangement as well.27 Once an agency relationship is
established, the agent is empowered to bring about, or alter, business and
legal relationships between the principal and third persons.28 However, the
agent also has a fiduciary duty to act loyally in the principal’s interest in all
matters connected to the agency relationship.29
Agency relationships appear within a broad range of industries and under
various circumstances.30 Elements of traditional agency law may, for
instance, be found in “relationships between employer and employee,
corporation and officer, client and lawyer, and partnership and general
partner.”31 Indeed, employer-employee relationships generally can be
thought of as falling under the wider umbrella of agency law.32 Thus,
employees, acting as agents, may bind their employers, as principals, to
contracts falling within the scope of their employment,33 including in
certain instances to debt instruments.34

25. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 1 (2014).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
27. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 392 (1982) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1958)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). These manifestations may be written or oral, or
communicated via conduct. Id. § 1.03; 3 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 25, Agency § 1 n.4.
28. 3 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 25, Agency § 2.
29. Id.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
31. Id.
32. 27 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 25, Employment Relationship § 3.
33. See, e.g., Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc. v. Ministry of Def. of Republic of
Venez., 575 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying Mississippi law in determining whether an
attorney acting for the Republic of Venezuela had the authority to enter into a settlement
agreement); Essco Geometric v. Harvard Indus., 46 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1995) (deciding
whether a purchasing agent had sufficient authority to enter into two-year, exclusive
contract); Six Flags, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 474 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D. Mass. 2007)
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2. Actual Authority Vs. Apparent Authority
An agent may act, and consequently bind a principal, pursuant to
different types of authority.35 The first is actual authority.36 An agent has
actual authority when the principal, either expressly or impliedly, authorizes
him to act in a certain matter.37 The existence of actual authority depends
on manifestations of consent between the principal and agent, and the agent
must reasonably believe that the principal wishes him to act on his behalf.38
An agent has actual authority to take actions reasonably designated or
implied by the principal’s manifestations.39 Moreover, an agent has actual
authority to undertake any acts necessary or incidental to attaining the
principal’s manifested goals.40
Second, an agent may bind a principal under the doctrine of apparent
authority, which is based on notions of estoppel.41 Apparent authority
exists where a third party reasonably believes an agent has the authority to
act on the principal’s behalf, based on the principal’s own manifestations to
the third party.42 In this way, the doctrine requires determinations
regarding not only the subjective beliefs of third parties, but also the
reasonableness of such beliefs.43
Thus, an agent acting with apparent authority may bind a principal to a
transaction with a third party, even where the principal has not actually
authorized him to do so.44 However, the third party’s reliance must be both
reasonable and in good faith,45 and, consequently, a principal will not be

(concluding that an executive of a water ride manufacturer had the authority to bind the
manufacturer to a contract with an amusement park).
34. See, e.g., Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01–.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2006)
(addressing different types of authority).
36. Id. § 2.01.
37. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 8 (2014).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
39. Id. § 2.02.
40. Id.
41. 2A C.J.S., supra note 37, Agency § 8.
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The existence of
some manifestation to a third party is the essential element to the creation of apparent
authority, id. § 3.03, as opposed to actual authority, which requires some manifestation
between the principal and agent themselves. Id. § 2.01.
43. While the application of the doctrine of apparent authority varies slightly by
jurisdiction, many jurisdictions explicitly note this requirement of subjective belief. See
Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1073 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A party claiming
apparent authority of an agent must prove (1) that the acting party subjectively believed that
the agent had authority to act for the principal and (2) that the subjective belief in the agent’s
authority was objectively reasonable.”); Poly-Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 260 F.3d 465, 480 (5th
Cir. 2001). But cf. Ja Dan, Inc. v. L-J, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 894, 900 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(“Apparent authority does not arise from the subjective understanding of the person dealing
with the purported agent . . . .”).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 2A C.J.S.,
supra note 37, Agency § 8.
45. 2A C.J.S., supra note 37, Agency § 159.
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bound by an unauthorized act if the third party knew, or had actual or
constructive notice of, the agent’s lack of authority.46
3. Inherent Authority Vs. Agency by Estoppel
In limited circumstances, a principal may be bound to a transaction
authorized by an agent via the doctrine of inherent agency power.47
Inherent agency power refers to the power of an agent to bind a principal
that is derived not from authority, actual or apparent, but rather from the
agency relationship itself.48 Inherent agency power may, consequently,
exist in the absence of any manifestation from the principal to a third
party,49 distinguishing it from apparent authority.50 Therefore, inherent
agency power works to protect especially innocent or disadvantaged third
parties, often in the context of tort liability or the loss of property caused by
improper agent action.51
The Restatement (Third) of Agency has, however, rejected this notion of
inherent agency power.52 It instead argues that other related aspects of
agency law encompass the doctrine’s concerns, principally the doctrine of
agency by estoppel.53 Specifically, this doctrine provides that the principal
will be liable where a third party has justifiably relied, and acted to their
detriment, upon the belief that an actor is an agent of the principal.54 The
principal must, however, have intentionally or recklessly caused this belief,
or had notice of such belief and failed to take reasonable steps to notify the
third party.55 Therefore, “[t]he operative question is whether a reasonable
person in the position of the third party would believe such an agent, as the
actor appears to be, to have authority to do a particular act.”56 In this way,
the doctrine likewise seeks to protect disadvantaged third parties, absent
any concrete manifestations from the principal to a third party.57
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Part I.B.1 begins by broadly defining the doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity. Next, Part I.B.2 discusses the traditional theory of foreign
sovereign immunity, known as the absolute theory of sovereign immunity,
in greater detail. In turn, Part I.B.3 looks to the more modern theory of
restrictive foreign sovereign immunity. Finally, Part I.B.4 examines the
modern statutory codification of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity
in the FSIA.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. § 167.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
Id.
See id.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
Id.
Id. § 2.05.
Id.
Id. § 2.05 cmt. c.
Id. § 2.05 cmt. d.
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1. The Doctrine of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity embodies the general
principle of international law that a foreign government, including its agents
and instrumentalities, shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of another
state’s domestic courts, absent its consent.58 This doctrine has deep roots,
stretching back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which itself laid the
grounds for the current international, or Westphalian, system.59 Sovereign
immunity is understood to naturally flow from the bedrock principles of this
system,60 namely the inviolability and equality of sovereign states,61 in that
it requires a nation’s sovereignty, or its “political independence and power
to conduct internal matters without outside interference,” to be universally
respected.62
While the doctrine may have originated in the era of individual
monarchs, it has been widely retained across the globe in various forms.63
Some nations adhere rigidly to the traditional formulation of foreign
sovereign immunity, but the majority of nations today, including most
European nations and the United States, have enacted more flexible
versions of the doctrine in order to reflect the realities of the modern
globalized world.64
2. The Ancien Régime:
The Absolute Theory of Sovereign Immunity
For much of U.S. history, foreign sovereigns were accorded complete
immunity from domestic courts under the theory of absolute sovereign
immunity, which in essence provides that “a foreign state [may] not be sued
whatsoever without its consent.”65 The basis for this theory was first
elucidated over two centuries ago in Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,66
where Chief Justice John Marshall concluded that an armed French naval
vessel docked in Philadelphia was immune from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.67 The Chief Justice reasoned that such immunity was generally
58. See Andrew B. Pittman, Ambassadorial Waiver of Foreign State Sovereign Immunity
to Domestic Adjudication in United States Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 645, 647 (2001).
59. See David P. Vandenberg, In the Wake of Republic of Austria v. Altmann: The
Current Status of Foreign Immunity in United States Courts, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 739, 740
(2006).
60. See id. (“The international law doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity was born as
an organic byproduct of the current international system.”).
61. Pittman, supra note 58, at 650.
62. Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 740.
63. See Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 356–58 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting the existence of both a traditional formulation
of the doctrine, as well as a more modern version adopted by a number of states).
64. See Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 741–42 (“However, courts in many other states—
most notably the traditional European powers—began denying immunity in cases where the
state was sued for activities of a mere commercial or private nature.”).
65. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of Petroleum Exp.
Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553, 565 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
66. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
67. Id. at 147.
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recognized under the law of nations.68 While this opinion could have been
read narrowly to apply only in the realm of governmental or military action,
lower courts construed it broadly to extend immunity to commercial
transactions.69 The Supreme Court later explicitly adopted this expansive
theory of immunity in the 1926 case Berrizi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro.70
However, the Court also made it clear that the bestowal of immunity was
a “matter of grace and comity.”71 Therefore, a two-step procedure
developed for those sovereigns seeking immunity.72 The first step required
the sovereign’s diplomatic representative to seek a formal suggestion of
immunity from the U.S. State Department.73 Secondly, if the State
Department granted the request, the court would decline to exercise
jurisdiction.74 During this period, however, the usual policy of the
executive branch was simply to request immunity for all (friendly)
nations.75
3. Middle of the Road:
The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity
This status quo prevailed for most of the early twentieth century, but was
increasingly criticized as foreign governments (and corporations owned or
controlled by foreign governments) became more active in international
commerce.76 It was argued that American business interests required
greater protection when dealing with state owned corporations, which
would otherwise be able to successfully claim immunity in U.S. courts
during disputes.77 Moreover, many nations began to abandon the absolute
theory of immunity in the early twentieth century, leading to an

68. Id. at 125; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
69. Clinton L. Narver, Putting the “Sovereign” Back in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: The Case for a Time of Filing Test for Agency or Instrumentality Status, 19
B.U. INT’L L.J. 163, 167–68 (2001).
70. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
71. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
72. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2778, 2284 (2010).
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1943) (noting that
the policy was to generally defer to the executive branch in determining whether to invoke
jurisdiction). If the State Department declined to provide guidance, however, the court could
decide for itself whether to recognize a claim of immunity. Id. at 587. Specifically, the court
would analyze whether the ground or grounds of the immunity claim were generally
recognized by the State Department. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36
(1945).
75. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 677 (2004).
76. Narver, supra note 69, at 168; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605 (“American citizens are increasingly coming into contact
with foreign states and entities owned by foreign states.”).
77. Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 744.

1292

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

asymmetrical situation where the United States was subject to suit in the
same nations to which it continually granted blanket immunity.78
This state of affairs led the State Department to issue the so-called Tate
Letter in 1952.79 This letter ushered in the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, which provides immunity only for a sovereign’s public acts, as
opposed to its private, commercial ones.80 While U.S. courts had
previously touched upon this theory, it had never been formally adopted.81
This new introduction, however, “threw immunity decisions into some
disarray.”82 Specifically, certain foreign states began to utilize their
diplomatic influence to pressure the State Department into making a formal
suggestion of immunity to the court.83 This in turn led to a number of
inconsistencies in the bestowal of immunity, as the merits of a case became
secondary to political motivations.84 Moreover, when foreign states failed
to formally request immunity via the State Department, the judiciary was
still required to determine if immunity actually existed, leaving decisions on
sovereign immunity split between the two government branches.85 This
only exacerbated the inconsistencies in sovereign immunity cases, further
illustrating the need for a formal mechanism to govern claims of
immunity.86
4. The Modern Regime:
The Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
In response to this muddled situation, Congress passed the FSIA in
1976.87 Congress provided that the dual purposes of the statute were “(1) to
endorse and codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and (2) to
transfer primary responsibility for deciding ‘claims of foreign states to

78. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6605 (“Moreover, [restrictive sovereign immunity] is regularly applied against the United
States in suits against the U.S. Government in foreign courts.”).
79. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Acting Att’y
Gen. Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 984–85
(1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter].
80. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983); Tate Letter,
supra note 79, at 984 (“[T]he immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to
sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure
gestionis).”).
81. See, e.g., The Pesaro, 277 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
82. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 677 (2004).
83. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (“[A]
foreign state may attempt to bring diplomatic influences to bear upon the State Department’s
determination.”).
84. See Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 745 (“Thus, whether immunity was actually
deserved became a secondary consideration in some instances.”).
85. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 677–78; see also Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 746 (noting the
possibility of judicial contradictions in sovereign immunity cases).
86. Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 746 (“The two layers of potential inconsistency—
State Department politics and judicial contradictions—soon gave rise to the need for a
method of stabilizing decision-making in determinations of foreign sovereign immunity.”).
87. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
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immunity’ from the State Department to the courts.”88 In doing so,
legislators hoped that the statute would “create uniform and predictable
standards for litigation involving foreign governments.”89 Additionally, the
statute was intended to remain consonant with principles of international
law90 and to “promote harmonious international relations.”91 The FSIA
facilitated these objectives by formally establishing when and how parties
could initiate and maintain suits against foreign states in U.S. courts and
when a sovereign was entitled to immunity.92
The statutory framework of the FSIA remains in force today and
“provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the
courts of [the United States].”93 The first portion of the statute grants
sovereigns a presumption of absolute immunity, mandating that foreign
states—including their agents and instrumentalities—shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.94 However, the second portion of the statute
carves out three major exceptions to this general rule, in keeping with a
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.95 They are termed the
waiver, commercial activity, and noncommercial tort exceptions.96 When
88. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2285 (2010); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012)
(“The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign
states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice
and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts.”).
89. Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1297–98 (11th Cir.
1999); see also Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 (“Congress passed the [FSIA] in order to free the
Government from the case-by-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing standards,
and to assure litigants that decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures
that insure due process.” (internal quotations omitted)).
90. Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1294–95; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 9 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6608 (noting that passage of the FSIA would bring
the United States into conformity with the majority of states by transferring decisions
regarding immunity to its judicial system).
91. Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Pullman
Constr. Indus. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 1994)).
92. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 620 (1983) (“[T]he Act was not intended to affect the substantive law determining the
liability of a foreign state or instrumentality.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605 (“The purpose of the proposed legislation . . . is
to provide when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities
in the courts of the United States and to provide when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign
immunity.”).
93. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433 (1989); see
also Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2279 (noting that the preexisting common law was entirely
displaced by the passage of the statute).
94. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603–1604 (2012) (“Subject to existing international agreements . . . a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of
the States.”).
95. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488–89 (1983); see also
Narver, supra note 69, at 169–70.
96. Narver, supra note 69, at 170 (“The three most significant exceptions to the [FSIA]’s
presumptive grant of immunity are waiver, commercial activity, and noncommercial tort.”).
The waiver exception provides that a foreign state shall not be immune if it has waived its
immunity, either explicitly or implicitly. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). The commercial tort
exception additionally provides that a foreign state shall not be immune where monetary
damages are sought in connection with injury, death, or damage, or loss of property in the
United States, as the result of tortious acts committed by the state or its actors. Id.
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any one of these exceptions is triggered, the statute provides that the foreign
state shall be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts as if it were a private
individual.97
C. The Commercial Activity Exception
The most significant of the exceptions codified in the FSIA is the socalled commercial activity exception.98 In its simplest terms, the exception
works to “strip[] a sovereign of immunity when it engages in conduct
commercial in nature”99 and, therefore, represents the statutory embodiment
of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.100 More specifically, the
provision stipulates that a foreign state surrenders its jurisdictional
immunity where it: (1) carries on a commercial activity in the United
States; (2) performs an act in the United States related to its commercial
activities elsewhere; or (3) performs an act outside of the United States
related to its commercial activities elsewhere that causes a direct effect in
the United States.101
In defining “commercial activity,” the FSIA provides that the term may
refer to either a particular commercial act or transaction, or “a regular
course of commercial conduct.”102 Moreover, it mandates that, in
determining whether an act is “commercial,” courts must look to the nature
of the transaction or course of conduct rather than to its purpose.103
As the Court has noted, “[t]his definition, however, leaves the critical
term ‘commercial’ largely undefined.”104 Namely, it specifies (1) that
commerciality does not depend on whether it is a single or regular
occurrence, and (2) which element should be used to determine
commerciality, while failing to explain what “commercial” actually

§ 1605(a)(5). This Note deals exclusively with the second exception, the commercial
activity exception. See infra Part I.C.
97. See Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 609 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting
that an action against a foreign state “must fall within one of the FSIA’s exceptions to
foreign sovereign immunity” in order for the court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction);
Narver, supra note 69, at 170.
98. See generally Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992).
Indeed, most cases involving plaintiffs’ claims that a foreign sovereign lacks immunity are
premised on this exception. George K. Chamberlin, Exceptions to Jurisdictional Immunity of
Foreign States and Their Property Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1602 et seq.), 59 A.L.R. Fed. 99 (1986).
99. 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 139 (2015).
100. Narver, supra note 69, at 170.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States . . . in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States . . . .”); see also
Rogers v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 673 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting the commercial
activity exception provides three separate bases for denying sovereign immunity).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
103. Id.
104. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992).

2015]

AGENCY AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

1295

means.105 Consequently, the Court has had to determine precisely what
types of activity are “commercial” for the purposes of the statute. In
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,106 the Court began this analysis by
holding that, because the FSIA codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, the statute’s meaning is what Congress understood the restrictive
theory to require at the time it passed the statute.107 The Court noted that,
per the Tate Letter, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was
understood to grant immunity only to a state’s public actions, not its
commercial activities.108 Therefore, it concluded that “when a foreign
government acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private
player within [it, the foreign sovereign’s] actions are ‘commercial’ within
the meaning of the FSIA.”109
The Court has further emphasized that determining whether a state acts
as a private party “is a question of behavior, not motivation.”110 In other
words:
[T]he question is not whether the foreign government is acting with a
profit motive or . . . the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives.
Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state
performs . . . are the type of actions by which a private party engages in
“trade and traffic or commerce.”111

Applying these principles to the case at bar, the Court went on to hold
that the issuance of government bonds, even where such an issuance is
designed to address an economic crisis, is a commercial activity for the
purposes of the statutory exception.112 In contrast, in Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson,113 the Court held that the plaintiff’s wrongful imprisonment could
not trigger the exception, as, under the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, the exercise of police power is a public, sovereign act.114
D. Tying It Together:
Agency Principles and Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Part I.D.1 of this Note begins by examining the general pattern followed
in litigation involving agency principles and claims of foreign sovereign
immunity. A more specific subset of this litigation is then introduced in
Part I.D.2, which gives context for understanding the relatively modern
phenomenon of sovereign debt litigation. Part I.D.3 then examines a
subcategory of sovereign debt litigation, namely, holdout litigation
105. Id.
106. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
107. See id. at 612–13; see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 368–70 (1993)
(White, J., concurring).
108. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 613–14 (citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 (1976)).
109. Id. at 607.
110. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 360.
111. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 615–17.
113. 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
114. Id. at 361.
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conducted by so-called vulture funds. Lastly, Part I.D.4 illustrates how
agency principles may be applied within the sovereign debt litigation
discussed in Parts I.D.2 and I.D.3 by closely examining a paradigmatic
case.
1. Litigation Generally
Pursuant to the commercial activity exception, a sovereign may be bound
to commercial agreements via the traditional law of agency.115 In sovereign
immunity claims involving agency principles, plaintiffs tend to allege an
agency relationship between a sovereign and an actor in order to collect
from the (theoretically) deep-pocketed sovereign.116 Because sovereign
immunity is a question of subject matter jurisdiction,117 courts must address
claims of immunity prior to making any determinations on the merits.118
Therefore, the defendant must first satisfy the court that it is indeed a
“foreign state” for the purposes of the FSIA; once it has done so, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the claim “falls within the scope
of . . . [the commercial activity] exception.”119
While these cases encompass a range of various commercial activities,120
a particularly relevant illustration is found in the field of sovereign debt
litigation and, more specifically, holdout litigation conducted by investment
funds focusing on sovereign debt.

115. See Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 592 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Under
traditional agency principles, the foreign state may engage in commerce in the United
States . . . indirectly by acting through its agents or subagents.”), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct.
1172 (2015).
116. See, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v.
Republic of Romania, 123 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (seeking to enforce a settlement
agreement, stemming from the contractual breach of the Romanian state shipping company,
which was signed by the Romanian Minister of Finance).
117. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (“[S]ubjectmatter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one of the specified
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.” (citation omitted)); see also Nelson, 507 U.S. at
355 (“[U]nless a specified exception applies, a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
over a claim against a foreign state.”).
118. See Best Med. Belg., Inc. v. Belgium, 913 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236 (E.D. Va. 2012)
(citing Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004)) (“A motion to
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds requires a court ‘to satisfy itself of its authority to
hear a case’ through pretrial legal and factual determinations.”).
119. EduMoz, LLC v. Republic of Mozambique, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1061 (C.D. Cal.
2013) (citing Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010)); see
also 1964 Realty LLC v. Consulate of the State of Qatar-New York, No. 14 Civ. 6429, 2015
WL 5197327, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2015) (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof on the applicability of an exception, although the “the ultimate burden of persuasion of
demonstrating that an FSIA exception does not apply lies with Defendant”).
120. See, e.g., Allfreight Worldwide Cargo, Inc. v. Ethiopian Airlines Enter., 307 F.
App’x 721 (4th Cir. 2009) (analyzing a breach of contract); Republic of Benin v. Mezei, No.
06 Civ. 870 (JGK), 2010 WL 3564270 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010) (concerning a real estate
conveyance); Amorrortu v. Republic of Peru, 570 F. Supp. 2d 916 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
(concerning government confiscation of oil interests).
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2. Sovereign Debt Litigation
Sovereign debt litigation is a relatively recent phenomenon, considering
that sovereigns were almost entirely immune from suit until the middle of
the twentieth century.121 Following the codification of the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity via the FSIA, sovereigns were, at least theoretically,
open to suit for certain commercial activities.122 In 1992, the Court
clarified in Weltover that, for the purposes of the FSIA, a sovereign’s
issuance of public debt is a commercial activity.123 Almost simultaneously,
sovereign debtors began waiving their sovereign immunity, explicitly
consenting to U.S. courts’ jurisdiction when entering into commercial
transactions.124 The predictable result of this combination was that
creditors increasingly began to utilize litigation in an effort to enforce
claims against sovereign debtors.125 Litigation only became more alluring
for sovereign creditors after a series of favorable decisions in U.S. domestic
courts in the wake of the Latin American debt crisis.126
3. Holdout Litigation and Investment Funds
This combination of factors has led to the increased popularity of holdout
litigation, often conducted by distressed-debt investors, which are more
commonly, and less flatteringly, termed “vulture funds.”127 These funds,
usually hedge funds or mutual funds, are commonly based in tax havens
and tend be secretive in nature.128 They profit by purchasing the bonds of
financially distressed countries on the secondary debt market, often at
substantial discounts from their face value because the sovereign is at or
near default.129 The investors then file suit, typically in creditor-friendly
jurisdictions, to enforce the full value of the debt,130 often urging courts to
take an expansive view of exceptions to sovereign immunity.131 Because
they are entitled to the full amount of the claim, which amounts to principal
plus any unpaid interest, vulture funds have a strong incentive to hold out

121. See supra Part I.B.1.
122. See supra Part I.B.4.
123. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992).
124. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1076 (2004).
125. Id.
126. See Broomfield, supra note 20, at 481–83. Specifically, the relevant cases include
Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and
Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
which is often referred to as the first case of holdout litigation in the context of sovereign
debt. Broomfield, supra note 20, at 481–83.
127. See Broomfield, supra 20, at 485–86.
128. Id.
129. Id.; Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt
Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos and Other Legal Fauna, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 49
(2010). The term “vulture fund” is derived from this practice, as the funds are seen as taking
advantage of debtor nations when they are at their most vulnerable. Id.
130. Broomfield, supra note 20, at 486.
131. See Blackman, supra note 129, at 50.
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for full payment.132 Indeed, they are not subject to the same pressures as
repeat investors, meaning that they are often successful in obtaining
substantial payments via such holdout litigation to the detriment of other
investors and the sovereign debtor itself.133
4. Agency Application:
The Democratic Republic of the Congo
A paradigmatic example of sovereign debt litigation implicating agency
principles can be found in Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of
Congo,134 one of a multitude of cases involving the troubled state of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The litigation can be traced as far back
as 1980, when the Republic of Zaire and its national bank entered into a
credit refinancing agreement with some of its plethora of creditors.135 In
the years following the signing of this agreement, Zaire was “plagued with
political and social instability,”136 and the country eventually defaulted on
the credit obligations in 1990.137 In May 1997, following the ouster of the
country’s infamous and longstanding dictator Joseph-Desire Mobutu in a
coup, the self-declared President Laurent-Desire Kabila changed the name
of the country to the Democratic Republic of the Congo138 (DRC). The
DRC later reaffirmed its obligations under the agreement in a series of
acknowledgement letters, the most recent of which was signed in 2003 by
the interim Minister of Finance, as well as the Governor of the Central
Bank139 (“the 2003 letter”).
The plaintiffs in the case, Themis Capital and Des Moines Investments,
LLC, purchased the debt obligations specified in the agreement from
various creditors.140 They then brought suit in the Southern District of New
York, alleging that the DRC had breached its contractual obligations under
the credit agreement by failing to pay any of the principal or interest

132. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 124, at 1045 n.2.
133. Id. at 1090. Specifically, this is because vulture funds are not repeat players in the
international debt market and therefore have little incentive to take actions that are best for
the international community, or with the long-term in mind. See James Thuo Gathii, The
Sanctity of Sovereign Loan Contracts and Its Origins in Enforcement Litigation, 38 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251, 267 (2006).
134. 881 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). This case represents only the first decision in
a series of litigation that will be discussed throughout this Note. See Themis Capital II, 35 F.
Supp. 3d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2015 WL 5711815 (2d Cir. Sept.
30, 2015).
135. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
136. Id. at 513.
137. Themis Capital II, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 462.
138. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
139. Id. The court noted that the specific intent of these letters was to reassure creditors
that the originally refinanced debts were still collectible and that they made specific
reference to the inapplicability of New York’s statute of limitations provisions. Id. at 513–
14.
140. See id. at 512.
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specified.141 The DRC claimed that neither the interim Minister of Finance
nor the Governor of the Central Bank had the requisite authority to sign the
2003 acknowledgement letter reaffirming the DRC’s debt obligations and
that the plaintiffs’ claim was therefore time barred.142
The court began its analysis by noting that, per New York law, “apparent
authority can bind foreign governments whose acts are private, including
enter [sic] into commercial transactions on apparent behalf of a sovereign
state.”143 The court then determined that the act of restructuring debt is a
quintessentially commercial, private one that may deprive a sovereign of
immunity in the context of the FSIA.144 Consequently, the court launched
into an analysis under the doctrine of apparent authority, looking to “(1)
what the general responsibilities were of the persons holding those
domestic-government positions at the time of the 2003 [l]etter, and (2) how
these responsibilities were communicated to persons outside of the DRC,
The court
including counterparties in commerce transactions.”145
concluded that further discovery was necessary to make factual
determinations on these issues, as well as on the question of whether the
plaintiffs had breached their own duty to inquire whether the letter was
valid.146
Following discovery and a bench trial, the court determined that the two
state officials had both actual and apparent authority to sign the 2003
acknowledgement letter, and thus the DRC was bound to its debt
obligations.147 In regard to their actual authority, the DRC argued that, per
an official decree, only the entire Council of Ministers had the authority to
renew debt obligations.148 The court, however, interpreted this decree to
require such approval only where decisions would have “budgetary
repercussions.”149 It then went on to hold that the 2003 acknowledgement
letter did not involve any such repercussions, as it merely constituted a
routine tolling agreement, and that, consequently, the two lone officials had
actual authority to sign the letter.150

141. Id. at 514. The court noted that the original creditors had not brought any claims
themselves alleging a breach of the agreement prior to transferring their rights to the
plaintiffs. Id. at 513.
142. Id. at 518. The DRC had originally made a blanket claim of sovereign immunity,
but the court determined that a waiver clause in the original credit agreement was
enforceable and stripped the DRC of a presumption of immunity. See id. at 516–17.
143. Id. at 526; Themis Capital II, 35 F. Supp. 3d 457, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that
the court in Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo (Themis Capital I)
rejected the DRC’s arguments of sovereign immunity, because the DRC could be bound, in
principle, under the doctrine of actual and apparent authority), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
2015 WL 5711815 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
144. See Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507
U.S. 349, 360 (1992)).
145. Id. at 527.
146. Id. at 531–32.
147. Themis Capital II, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 494.
148. Id. at 476.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 477–78.

1300

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

The court also determined that the DRC was bound by virtue of its
agents’ apparent authority.151 Specifically, the court found that it was
“eminently reasonable” for creditors to believe that the acting Minister of
Finance and Governor of the Central Bank possessed sufficient authority to
sign the letter.152 First, it found that the belief was justified based on the
two officials’ status as national-level officers, charged with maintaining the
DRC’s monetary policy and fiscal stability.153 Second, the court noted that
previous Finance Ministers and Governors of the Central Bank had signed
two earlier acknowledgement letters without objection.154 It therefore
found that it would be reasonable for creditors to assume that “these same
two officials had the authority to sign a substantively identical letter in
2003.”155 The court additionally determined that creditors’ duty of inquiry
was not triggered, because the transaction was not extraordinary and there
were no factual circumstances that should have put creditors on notice of a
danger of fraud.156
Having determined that the agents’ signing of the 2003
acknowledgement letter bound the DRC, the court held that the plaintiffs’
claim was not barred by the New York statute of limitations provision and
entered judgment in their favor.157 The court awarded Themis damages of
$38,711,890.27 and Des Moines $30,826,825.24.158
II. LET’S GET READY TO RUMBLE:
DIVERGENT APPLICATIONS OF APPARENT AUTHORITY
IN THE LOWER COURTS
This part investigates the conflicting views of the federal circuits in
applying the legal principles and theories discussed in Part I. Specifically,
Part II.A examines the minority rule, as crafted by the Second Circuit in
First Fidelity. Part II.B looks to the rule adopted by the majority of circuit
courts by walking through decisions of the Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits.

151. Id. at 479–80.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 480.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 481. The court’s conclusions on authority seem to have been much influenced
by the fact that the two older acknowledgement letters, from 1991 and 1997 respectively,
had not been discovered at the time of the first decision. Id. at 472. Indeed, in that case, the
court noted the somewhat suspicious signing of the 2003 letter, which, on “behalf of a cashpoor country, renewed a financial obligation, now totaling approximately $80 million,
against which claims were long barred by the statute of limitations, and evidently for no
consideration whatsoever.” Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
157. Themis Capital II, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 494.
158. Id. The Second Circuit recently affirmed almost the entirety of the Court’s holding,
reversing only a portion of the decision related to the calculation of damages. Themis
Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, Nos. 14-4016-cv(L), 14-4168-cv(XAP),
2015 WL 5711815, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
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A. The Minority Position
Part II.A.1 examines, at greater length, the Second Circuit’s elucidation
of the minority rule in its decision in First Fidelity. Part II.A.2 surveys the
dissenting opinion in First Fidelity, as well as subsequent disagreements
with, or reinterpretations of, this minority rule.
1. The Second Circuit
Most simply put, the minority position holds that the doctrine of apparent
authority applies to sovereigns and their agents in the context of foreign
sovereign immunity claims.159 As previously noted, the Second Circuit
first elucidated this rule in its landmark decision, First Fidelity.160 The
plaintiff in the case, First Fidelity, contended that the Antiguan Ambassador
to the UN, Loydstone Jacobs, had actual authority to bind Antigua to a loan
agreement and waive its sovereign immunity in a settlement agreement.161
First Fidelity argued in the alternative that even if Jacobs lacked actual
authority, he had sufficient apparent authority to bind Antigua.162
Specifically, First Fidelity emphasized that the authority inherent in
Jacobs’s position as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary was,
standing alone, sufficient to render his actions binding.163 In response, the
Antiguan Government contended that, under Antiguan law, “the authority
to borrow funds requires the prior approval of the cabinet and a delegation
of authority to the Minister of Finance[] and that neither had occurred in
this case.”164 Therefore, because Jacobs acted without authority, Antigua
asserted that it had retained its sovereign immunity under the FSIA.165
The court began its analysis of these claims by reviewing principles of
international law, citing to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations for
the basic proposition that an Ambassador’s powers include the authority to
sign international agreements.166 As such, it noted that an Ambassador has
the authority to bind the state he represents and that, under certain
circumstances, “a state can be bound by [a] representative’s unauthorized
actions where the lack of authority is not obvious.”167
159. See generally First Fidelity Bank v. Gov’t of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189 (2d
Cir. 1989); see also 1964 Realty LLC v. Consulate of the State of Qatar-New York, No. 14
Civ. 6429, 2015 WL 5197327, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2015) (“However, regardless of how
other courts have ruled, this Court is bound by the Second Circuit’s case law and is thus
required to apply the doctrine of apparent authority as the Circuit has instructed.”). But cf.
Republic of Benin v. Mezei, 06 Civ. 870, 2010 WL 3564270, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010)
(“[A]pparent authority is insufficient in dealing with the federal or state governments.”).
160. For a more detailed discussion of the factual circumstances of the case, see supra
INTRODUCTION.
161. First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 191–92.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 192.
164. Id. at 197 (Newman, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 191 (majority opinion).
166. Id. at 192 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 311 (AM. LAW
INST. 1987)).
167. Id. The court pointed to the example of Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v.
Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5), where the Permanent Court of International
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However, the court went on to reject First Fidelity’s implied argument
that Antigua was bound by Jacobs’s actions solely by virtue of his
position.168 The court based this conclusion on principles governing the
validity of international agreements.169 The court reasoned that if the
circumstances surrounding an Ambassador’s signing of an international
agreement could render it void, then the mere act of signing such an
agreement could not automatically bind a sovereign either.170
The court also looked to section 207 of the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations, which provides that a state is liable for an agent’s
violation of international legal obligations when the agent is acting in the
scope, or under color, of authority.171 While facially this would seem to
bolster First Fidelity’s position, the court concluded that the provision
applied only to violations of international law and not to commercial
agreements.172 Therefore, the court held that “an ambassador’s actions
under color of authority do not, as a matter of law, automatically bind the
state.”173
The court did, however, note that section 207 included elements of
agency law in requiring consideration of all the circumstances in assessing
the scope of authority.174 This was particularly relevant to the facts of the
case at bar, because it required investigation of “whether the affected parties
reasonably considered the action to be official[] [and] whether the action
was for public purpose or for private gain.”175 Therefore, the court
concluded that the law of agency provided the appropriate analytical
framework176—the proper question was whether Jacobs, by virtue of his
ambassadorial position, had the apparent authority to borrow funds and/or
waive sovereign immunity via a settlement agreement.177
The court began its discussion of this question by citing to the general
principles of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, noting that “[t]he

Justice held that Norway was bound by the Norwegian Foreign Minister’s oral statement that
the country would not contest Danish control of Eastern Greenland. Id.
168. See id. (“[T]he possession of authority does not, ipso facto, validate every exercise
of it.”).
169. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 331(2)(a) (AM. LAW
INST. 1987)).
170. See id. at 192–93 (“If the circumstances surrounding an ambassador’s signature of a
treaty may be grounds for invalidating that treaty, then surely a state cannot automatically be
bound by its ambassador’s settlement of a lawsuit by a non-sovereign third party arising
from a commercial transaction.”).
171. Id. at 193 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 207(c) (AM.
LAW INST. 1987)).
172. Id. The court noted that a breach of a commercial agreement could violate this
section if it was discriminatory, or it if occurred for official reasons, but neither was at issue
in the case. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 712(2) cmt. h,
Reporters’ n.8 (AM. LAW INST. 1987)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 207 cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST. 1987)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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appointment of a person to a position with generally recognized duties may
create apparent authority.”178 It found that the use of these agency
principles would ensure a requisite level of flexibility in its analysis.179
Specifically, it noted that these principles would give “appropriate weight”
to the authority of the relevant ambassadorship.180 It reasoned that agency
law would allow for consideration of Jacobs’s position, a factual
circumstance relevant in determining the reasonability of First Fidelity’s
reliance, but would not make his ambassadorship inevitably
determinative.181
The court, however, declined to make a determination on the merits,
holding that it would be impossible to make a decision where the facts were
“susceptible of two opposing interpretations.”182 Namely, it concluded that
First Fidelity had sufficiently alleged that Jacobs had possessed apparent
authority and, therefore, that Antigua was bound by his actions.183
However, the court also determined that there was some evidence that First
Fidelity had mistrusted Jacobs, which would impact the reasonability of its
reliance.184 The court thus vacated the default judgment, remanded the case
to district court, and required that Antigua post a bond in the amount
claimed by First Fidelity.185
2. The Second Circuit:
Dissents and Attempts at Reconciliation
In his dissenting opinion in First Fidelity, Judge Newman rejected the
majority’s decision on the grounds that it would severely impair U.S.
foreign relations.186 While he agreed that an Ambassador would not be
able to bind his or her government in every case, he noted that this finding
alone “does not inevitably lead to a conclusion that only apparent authority
furnishes the appropriate standard.”187 Rather, he advocated for the
application of the doctrine of inherent agency power as elucidated in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency.188 He justified this choice by asking

178. Id. at 193; see Jota v. Texaco, 157 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that an
Ambassador generally has the power to bind the state he represents); see also Themis Capital
I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[O]fficials have apparent authority to bind
foreign sovereigns when the obligation to which by the official committed is of the sort of
commitment that such an official ordinarily has the authority to make.”).
179. First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 194.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 195.
183. Id.
184. Id. Under New York law, a party claiming the existence of apparent authority must
show that he or she fulfilled the “duty of inquiry” or, in other words, that they had no notice
of the need to inquire further into the agent’s authority. See Gen. Overseas Films v. Robin
Int’l, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 684, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
185. First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 196.
186. Id. at 196–97 (Newman, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 198.
188. Id. For a discussion of general principles of inherent agency power, see supra Part
I.A.3.
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whether U.S. government relations would be better served by allowing
Ambassadors to promptly obtain goods or services, or by requiring third
parties to verify, in each instance, whether the Ambassador had the actual
authority to do so.189 Strongly advocating for the former, Judge Newman
highlighted that the majority’s rule could have a chilling effect, in that
vendors would be less willing to extend services or credit to embassies
under the shadow of litigation.190 Therefore, Judge Newman concluded
that Antigua should have been bound by Jacobs’s actions.191
In the same vein, other courts within the Second Circuit have questioned
the rule elucidated in First Fidelity. In Republic of Benin v. Mezei,192 Judge
John G. Koeltl referred to the holding in First Fidelity as a mere suggestion
that apparent authority could bind a foreign sovereign to a commercial
transaction.193 Therefore, he concluded that “[i]n general, apparent
authority is insufficient in dealing with the federal or state governments. A
person who contracts with a government agent . . . does so at the
individual’s peril if the agent is unauthorized.”194
Meanwhile, in Themis Capital, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer concluded that
“[a]lthough this Court is under no illusion that it can fully harmonize the
decisions in this area,” the circuit decisions were actually consistent with
one another.195 Specifically, the court found that the cases actually turned
on whether the specific legal commitment made by [an agent on] behalf
of the foreign government was (1) a public act, in which case apparent
authority has generally been held unavailable, except in the discrete
context presented by waivers of sovereign immunity by ambassadors; or
(2) a private act, in which case apparent authority has generally been held
available.196

In other words, Judge Engelmeyer has concluded that the circuit split is
not a split at all. Rather, the application of apparent authority depends on
whether the agent’s act is “public” or “private.”197 The court defined
private acts as those in which “a private party engages in trade and traffic or
189. First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 198–99 (Newman, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 199.
191. Id. at 200.
192. No. 06 Civ. 870, 2010 WL 3564270 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010).
193. Id. at *6.
194. Id. However, the court did go on to analyze the facts of the case applying the
doctrine of apparent authority, concluding that “even if a foreign government can be bound
by its agent acting with apparent authority, the defendants could not reasonably rely on [the
agent’s] purported authority.” Id. at *7.
195. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (emphasis added).
196. Id.; accord Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F. Supp. 2d 517, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“[C]ourts have interpreted that rule to permit apparent authority to bind a sovereign engaged
in private conduct but to demand actual authority to bind a sovereign engaged in public
conduct.”).
197. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. at 524. Other courts within the Second Circuit have,
however, declined to follow this analysis. See, e.g., 1964 Realty LLC v. Consulate of the
State of Qatar-New York, No. 14 Civ. 6429, 2015 WL 5197327, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4,
2015) (“While this Court finds Themis to be persuasive, it notes that in First Fidelity the
Second Circuit made no distinction between ‘public’ or ‘private’ acts . . . [a]ccordingly, the
Court declines to follow Themis.”).
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commerce.”198 Public acts, meanwhile, are those acts available to
sovereigns alone, such as a waiver of sovereign immunity.199 However, the
line between these two types of acts can be blurred. Specifically, an act
may be superficially private, because it deals with a commercial activity,
when it is actually public, because the underlying action is a waiver of
sovereign immunity.200
Having defined these categories of acts, Judge Engelmayer characterized
the Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits’ cases as dealing with public acts,
which explained why apparent authority was rejected.201 He argued that
while the acts in these cases seemed to be commercial in nature on their
faces, they actually concerned a waiver of sovereign immunity.202 Judge
Engelmayer then turned to Second Circuit decisions applying apparent
authority, concluding that they all dealt with either private acts of
government agents or ambassadorial waivers of sovereign immunity.203
Thus, Judge Engelmayer concluded that, in the instant case, which dealt
with the signing of an acknowledgement letter renewing certain state debt
obligations, the doctrine of apparent authority would apply because it
centered on the private, commercial act of restructuring sovereign debt.204
B. The Majority Position
Part II.B.1 examines the Ninth Circuit’s response to First Fidelity, in
which the majority rule denying the applicability of the doctrine of apparent
authority was first announced. Part II.B.2 then analyzes the Fourth
Circuit’s decision to adopt this majority rule, and Part II.B.3 does the same
as to the Fifth Circuit’s adoption.
1. The Ninth Circuit
In the aftermath of First Fidelity, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
apparent authority in the context of foreign sovereign immunity claims in
Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia.205 The plaintiff in the case, Curtis
Phaneuf, held certain promissory notes issued by members of the National
Defense Security Council of Indonesia206 (NDSC). These notes were part
of a greater issuance that was collectively valued at three billion dollars.207
The notes bore the crest of the NDSC and signatures of two NDSC

198. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (quoting NML Capital v. Republic of
Argentina, 680 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2012)).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 524–25 (collecting cases from the Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 525.
204. Id. at 526.
205. 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997).
206. Id. at 304. The NDSC was an advisory body formed by a decree of the Indonesian
President. Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 401 (4th Cir. 2004). The NDSC was
tasked with, among other things, conducting studies on national security. Id.
207. Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 304.
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members.208 The primary creator of these notes, Ibnu Hartomo, later traded
them for promissory notes issued by a Syrian financier.209 At a subsequent
signing ceremony in Damascus, the Indonesian Ambassador to Syria, H.A.
Chalid Mawardi, certified that Hartomo represented the Indonesian
government and that the notes were “Official/Governmental.”210 The
Syrian notes later proved to be worthless.211
The Indonesian Government claimed that it had no knowledge of the
notes until 1985, when it declared them invalid.212 In 1986, the Secretary
General of the NDSC alerted Bank Indonesia as to the invalidity of the
notes.213 The NDSC then issued a press release disavowing the notes and
stating that responsibility lay with their individual creators.214
After Bank Indonesia refused to honor Phaneuf’s notes, he sued the
Republic of Indonesia, the NDSC, and Mawardi in U.S. district court.215
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds
of sovereign immunity, holding that they had failed to establish a prima
facie case for immunity under the FSIA.216 The court relied on a footnote
in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,217 which required that, in
order to establish a presumption of immunity, a sovereign defendant must
establish that it is a sovereign state and that the plaintiff’s claim arises out
of a public act.218
The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that a sovereign
defendant need only prove they are a foreign state to be entitled to a
presumption of immunity under the FSIA.219 The court then launched into
a burden-shifting analysis,220 holding Phanuef met the initial burden of
pleading that the commercial activity exception applied to the case.221
208. Id.
209. Id. Hartomo and Soebagyo Soedewo, the other primary creator of the notes, were
NDSC Deputies for Development and Long-Term Planning. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 395.
Hartomo later admitted that he knew he was unauthorized to issue the notes and that the
former Secretary General of the NDSC had declared his two purported letters of
authorization to be forgeries. Id. at 395–96.
210. Phanuef, 106 F.3d at 304. The President of the Central Bank of Syria attended the
signing ceremony, and an official of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also notarized
Mawardi’s signature on the notes. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 395.
211. Phanuef, 106 F. at 304.
212. Id.
213. Id. He stated that the NDSC and its members lacked the authority to issue any such
promissory notes. Id.
214. Id. The international press widely reported on the forged notes and the consequent
Indonesian repudiation. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 396–97.
215. Phanuef, 106 F.3d at 304.
216. Id. at 305.
217. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
218. Id. at 708 n.9.
219. Phanuef, 106 F.3d at 305. The court also separately considered Mawardi’s
entitlement to immunity per the standard applied to individual foreign officials under the
FSIA. Id. at 306–07.
220. See supra Part I.D.1 for a general discussion of this burden-shifting framework.
221. Phanuef, 106 F.3d at 307. Specifically, the court concluded that Phanuef had
submitted sufficient evidence that the members of the NDSC had actual or apparent
authority to issue the notes. Id.
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Therefore, the burden shifted to the defendants to rebut this showing.222
The defendants argued that the exception could not apply because “there
was no ‘commercial activity of the foreign state.’”223 Specifically, the
defendants contended that they could not be bound by the NDSC members’
or Mawardi’s actions because those individuals acted outside the scope of
their authority in issuing the notes.224 The question therefore was narrowed
to “whether an agent of a foreign state must have acted with actual
authority to invoke the commercial activity exception against a foreign
state, or whether apparent authority suffices.”225
The court interpreted the FSIA to conclude that only “actual authority
can be used to invoke the [commercial activity] exception.”226 Specifically,
the court first noted that all three clauses of the exception require “a
commercial activity of the foreign state.”227 The plain meaning of this
provision, then, is that the state itself must be engaged in the commercial
activity for the exception to apply.228
The court then looked at the commercial activity exception through the
lens of agency law, reasoning that “[b]ecause a foreign state acts through its
agents, an agent’s deed which is based on the actual authority of the foreign
state constitutes activity ‘of the foreign state.’”229 Thus, where an agent
acts beyond the scope of his authority, the agent is not engaging in any
business the sovereign has authorized him to do.230 Therefore, the court
concluded, “If the foreign state has not empowered its agent to act, the
agent’s unauthorized act cannot be attributed to the foreign state[, because]
there is no ‘activity of the foreign state.’”231
The court bolstered this conclusion by turning to a number of
supplementary considerations. First, it referenced the rules of statutory
construction, including the rule of ordinary meaning and the rule against
implying exceptions.232 It also invoked the canon of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, reasoning that if Congress had intended the exception to

222. Id.
223. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012)).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)). The statutory language of the commercial
activity exception states,
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States . . . in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an
act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
228. Phanuef, 106 F.3d at 307.
229. Id. at 307–08.
230. Id. at 308.
231. Id.
232. See id. (citing Export Grp. v. Reef Indus., 54 F.3d 1466, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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encompass acts committed without actual authority, it could have said so
explicitly.233
The court also reinforced its “conclusion that evidence of apparent
authority should not be sufficient to invoke the FSIA’s commercial activity
exception” with precedent.234 For example, in Chuidian v. Philippine
National Bank,235 the Ninth Circuit ruled that an agent acting outside the
scope of his authority was not entitled to individual immunity under the
FSIA236 and that the natural corollary of this must be that a state retains its
immunity when an agent so acts.237 Additionally, in In re Estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation,238 the Ninth Circuit held
that the defendant’s acts were not entitled to immunity because they were
taken without official sanction.239 The court analogized that unofficial acts,
likewise, could not be considered “acts of a foreign state,” as required by
the plain language of the statute.240
Finally the court examined U.S. domestic immunity principles.241 The
court noted that when an actor deals with a putative agent of the United
States, it bears the risk that the agent is acting outside the scope of
authority, even if the actor reasonably believes the agent has sufficient
authority.242 Moreover, it observed that the United States can be estopped
from claiming immunity only where its agent acted within the scope of his
or her authority.243 The court concluded that these principles further
supported its conclusion that apparent authority is insufficient to invoke the
commercial activity exception.244
Thus, the court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
its ruling.245 On remand, the district court granted the defendant’s motion
to dismiss, finding that the issuers of the promissory notes lacked actual
authority, and, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.246

233. See id.
234. Id.
235. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
236. See id. at 1106.
237. Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 308.
238. 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
239. Id. at 498. The defendants in the case included the notorious ex-Philippine dictator
President Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoc. Id. at 495. The latter
claimed she was entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA, which divested federal
courts of jurisdiction over actions taken by a foreign government against its citizens (namely,
torture and execution). Id.
240. Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 308.
241. Id.
242. Id. (citing Fed. Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); Bollow v. Fed.
Reserve Bank, 640 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1981)).
243. Id. (citing Saulque v. United States, 663 F.2d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 1981)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 309.
246. See Phanuef v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 18 F. App’x 648 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 987 (2002).
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2. The Fourth Circuit
In Velasco v. Government of Indonesia,247 the Fourth Circuit expressly
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s holding.248 The case concerned more of the
same promissory notes dealt with in Phanuef.249 The plaintiff, George
Velasco, purchased the notes in Panama from an Italian businessman for
consideration equivalent to $2.1 million.250 He sued the Indonesian
government, the NDSC, Mawardi, and Hartomo in district court after the
Bank of Indonesia refused to honor payment of the notes.251 The district
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff
failed to prove that the individuals in question possessed apparent or actual
authority to issue the promissory notes.252
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by noting that, while courts
generally extend immunity to agents acting within their authority, the
“FSIA . . . does not immunize an official who acts beyond the scope of his
authority.”253 It observed that the FSIA mirrors federal common law
dealing with derivative sovereign immunity, where courts “held
[consistently] that the act of an agent beyond what he is legally empowered
to do is not binding upon the government.”254 The Fourth Circuit also
noted that persons dealing with U.S. agents have a duty to determine if the
agent has the requisite authority to bind the government255 and that the
mere belief an agent has authority is insufficient.256
The court then explicitly referenced both Phaneuf and First Fidelity,
criticizing the Second Circuit’s determination as one made “without
substantial explanation.”257 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that whether a
third party reasonably believes that an agent is authorized to engage in a
transaction is irrelevant when the state’s laws proscribe or do not authorize

247. 370 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2004).
248. Id. at 400.
249. See id. at 397.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 399.
254. Id. (citing The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. 666, 676 (1869)); see also Allfreight
Worldwide Cargo, Inc. v. Ethiopian Airlines Enter., 307 F. App’x 721, 724 (4th Cir. 2009)
(noting that the court in Velasco recognized that foreign sovereign immunity is analogous to
the United States’s sovereign immunity and the derivative immunity it extends to its
contractors and agents).
255. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 399 (citing Fed. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383–84
(1947)) (“[A]nyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of
having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within
the bounds of his authority.”).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 400. The court also cited to Storr v. National Defense Security Council of
Indonesia, No. 95 CIV. 9663, 1997 WL 633405 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1997), which dealt with
yet another plaintiff attempting to enforce these promissory notes. Id. In that case, the court
applied the doctrine of apparent authority, but ultimately concluded that the issuers of the
notes lacked such authority to issue the notes and, moreover, that the plaintiffs had not
fulfilled their required duty of inquiry. Id. at *3–4.
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the action taken.258 Therefore, it concluded that “a foreign official’s
manifestation of authority to bind the sovereign is insufficient,”259
expressly adopting the majority rule requiring actual authority.
Turning to the merits of the case, the court upheld the district court’s
dismissal.260 It held that the NDSC Secretary General’s statements that he
never signed letters of authorization undermined the letters Hartomo
claimed empowered him to issue the promissory notes.261 Moreover, the
court held that even if the letters were authentic, the Secretary General and
the NDSC itself lacked the authority to issue promissory notes under
Indonesian law.262 Specifically, the court noted that the NDSC was
established in order to advise on national security and defense matters and
that only the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank could incur debt on
behalf of the government.263 Moreover, the court found that while
Ambassadors could engage in commercial transactions in certain
circumstances under Indonesian law, Mawardi never obtained the necessary
authorization.264 Therefore, the court held that the issuance of the notes
was not a “commercial activity of a foreign state which divest[ed] the
NDSC or the Government of Indonesia of their sovereign immunity” and,
consequently, that the case was properly dismissed.265
3. The Fifth Circuit
Finally, the Fifth Circuit adopted the majority rule, as espoused by the
Ninth and Fourth Circuits, in Dale v. Colagiovanni.266 The plaintiffs were
receivers267 for a number of insurance companies, which were acquired and
looted by a con artist, Martin Frankel, over a nine-year period.268 The
plaintiffs alleged that Monsignor Emilio Colagiovanni, a member of the
papal curia and president of the Monitor Ecclesiasticus Foundation (MEF),
aided Frankel in these criminal activities.269 Specifically, they contended
that Frankel pitched Colagiovanni a plan to create a charitable organization
capitalized with $55 million, $50 million of which would be used for
acquiring insurance companies and $5 million for charitable purposes.270
Colagiovanni eventually allowed the MEF to serve as the settlor of record

258. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 400.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 402.
261. Id. at 401.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 401–02.
265. Id. at 402.
266. 443 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2006).
267. “A receiver is a neutral party appointed by the court to take possession of property
and preserve its value for the benefit of the person or entity subsequently determined to be
entitled to the property.” 75 C.J.S., supra note 37, Receivers § 1.
268. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 426.
269. Id. at 426–27.
270. Id. at 427.
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for Frankel’s charitable front organization, the St. Francis of Assisi
Foundation271 (SFAF).
In 1999, the Mississippi Department of Insurance investigated Frankel’s
insurance acquisitions in the state.272 In response, Frankel had SFAF
purchase the trust that had participated in the investments, causing the
Department of Insurance to call an emergency meeting.273 Colagiovanni
attended this meeting and represented that “Vatican-related entities had
contributed over $1 billion to SFAF.”274 Meanwhile, Frankel prepared to
flee the country, and regulators in Mississippi and four other states froze his
assets.275
The plaintiff-receivers eventually filed suit against Colagiovanni and the
Vatican in district court. The defendants in turn filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of foreign sovereign immunity.276 The plaintiffs countered
that Colagiovanni had acted with actual and apparent authority in engaging
in these fraudulent activities, exposing the Vatican to suit under the FSIA’s
commercial activity exception.277 The district court agreed with the
plaintiffs, denying the defendants’ motion based on the theory of apparent
authority.278 The defendants appealed, arguing that apparent authority was
insufficient to bind the Vatican under the FSIA.279
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis280 by citing to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Phaneuf for the proposition that the commercial activity
exception “makes clear that the activity must be that ‘of the foreign
state.’”281 It noted that this conclusion was bolstered by the Fourth
Circuit’s utilization of precedent illustrating that foreign sovereign
immunity extends to agents only when they are acting in an official
capacity.282 Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on two
additional cases dealing with the judicial status of government
“instrumentalities,” noting that the inquiries are “analytically distinct.”283
Therefore, the court “agree[d] with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits that an
agent’s acts conducted with the apparent authority of the state is insufficient
to trigger the commercial exception to FSIA.”284

271. Id. In other words, Frankel donated funds to the MEF, which would in turn be given
to the SFAF. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 428.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. The district court declined to consider any issues of actual authority, and the Fifth
Circuit consequently limited its review to a discussion of apparent authority. Id. at 428 n.1.
281. Id. at 428 (citing Phanuef v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir.
1997)).
282. Id. at 429.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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C. Summarizing the Circuit Split
Thus, one can plainly see that the circuits “have taken varying positions
on whether—and if so, when—a foreign government may be bound on a
theory of apparent authority.”285 Courts within the Second Circuit have
generally applied the doctrine of apparent authority in determining whether
a sovereign is bound by the actions of its agent.286 The Ninth, Fifth, and
Fourth Circuits have, however, declined to apply the doctrine. They have
instead held that, based on the text of the FSIA as well as various policy
considerations, only actual authority can serve to bind a sovereign to the
actions of its agents.287
III. THE (IDEAL) RESOLUTION: THE MAJORITY RULE(S)
This part ultimately argues for the adoption of the majority rule in the
context of sovereign debt litigation via congressional revision of the FSIA
or, in the alternative, via judicial review. Specifically, Part III.A discusses
how the minority rule works to undermine one of the main purposes behind
the FSIA, namely uniformity and predictability of decisions. In a similar
vein, Part III.B then examines how the minority view negatively impacts
U.S. foreign relations. Part III.C in turn argues that modern sovereign debt
creditors neither require nor deserve the added protection of the equitable
doctrine of apparent authority under the current sovereign immunity
framework. Part III.D then illustrates these concerns through the lens of the
Themis Capital litigation originally discussed in Part I.D. Finally, Part III.E
proposes a statutory revision of the FSIA endorsing the majority view, or,
failing such action, that the minority rule be explicitly overruled by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
A. Applying the Equitable Doctrine of Apparent Authority
to Sovereign Debt Disputes Undermines the Purpose of the FSIA
The application of apparent authority in sovereign debt disputes serves to
undermine one of the fundamental purposes of the FSIA, namely,
uniformity and predictability of decisions in foreign sovereign immunity
cases.288 As previously discussed, Congress intended the FSIA to function
as a comprehensive framework, bringing consistency and predictability to
actions involving claims of foreign sovereign immunity where there had
previously been none.289

285. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
286. Id. at 522–23 (citing Skanga Energy & Marine v. Arevenca S.A., 875 F. Supp. 2d
264, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Bitumenes Orinoco, S.A. v. New Brunswick Power Holding
Corp., No. 05 Civ. 9485(LAP), 2007 WL 485617 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007)).
287. See id. at 523.
288. See supra Part I.B.4.
289. See Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 37 F. Supp. 3d 381, 408 (D.D.C. 2014)
(discussing the general framework of the FSIA in the context of international treaties); H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (“A principal
purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive
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This professed statutory purpose is necessarily at odds with the
application of the doctrine of apparent authority. The doctrine is, by its
very nature, based on notions of estoppel290 and requires determinations
regarding not only the subjective beliefs of third parties, but also the
reasonableness of such beliefs.291 Thus, decisions concerning the existence
of apparent authority must necessarily be made on an ad hoc, case-by-case
basis, involving substantial factual inquiry.292 Indeed, this is evidenced in
the circuit court cases discussed in Part II, all of which entail complicated
factual scenarios.293
The use of such an ephemeral standard is manifestly contrary to the
FSIA, considering that “uniformity of jurisprudence” was one of the prime
motivations behind congress’s passage of the FSIA.294 This desirability for
uniformity of decisions stems from the fact that “disparate treatment of
cases involving foreign governments may have adverse foreign relations
consequences.”295 Indeed, the FSIA was designed, in part, to do away with
the “ambiguous and politically charged standards”296 which had governed
foreign sovereign immunity prior to its enactment and produced disparate
outcomes.
The application of an equitable doctrine requiring
individualized, case-by-case analysis logically would work to decrease any
uniformity of decisions, as well as to increase the very ambiguity the statute
was designed to remedy.
Application of actual authority likewise requires courts to make
determinations on an individualized basis contrary to the aforementioned
statutory scheme.297 But this contention overlooks the fact that actual
authority is a relatively bright-line standard when compared to the doctrine
of apparent authority. Actual authority requires either express or implied
branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity
determinations . . . .”).
290. See supra Part I.A.2.
291. See Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1033 (7th Cir. 1997)
(observing that a multitude of factors applied in determining the reasonability of a student’s
subjective belief on whether a school employee had apparent authority); United States v.
McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835, 838 (4th Cir. 1979) (Phillips, J., concurring) (concluding that there
was no basis for the existence of apparent authority in light of the subjective and objective
factors applied); 1964 Realty LLC v. Consulate of the State of Qatar-New York, No. 14 Civ.
6429, 2015 WL 5197327, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2015) (“Since the factual record is not
sufficiently developed, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff’s reliance was
reasonable.”); see also supra Part I.A.1.
292. See First Fidelity Bank v. Gov’t of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189, 197–99 (2d
Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s rule requiring the application
of apparent authority in turn necessitates adjudication on a case-by-case basis); 1964 Realty
LLC, 2015 WL 5197327, at *12 (“Ultimately, the Second Circuit has stressed that
‘reasonable reliance is often a question of fact for the jury rather than a question of law for
the court.’”); Pittman, supra note 58, at 683–84 (discussing the difficult application of
apparent authority within the context of the waiver exception to the FSIA).
293. For a detailed discussion of the factual circumstances of each case, see supra Part II.
294. Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co., 223 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2000).
295. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611.
296. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004) (citations omitted).
297. See Pittman, supra note 58, at 681 (concluding that inquiries into actual authority
also erode uniformity and predictability to an unacceptable degree).
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authorization from a principal to an agent.298 In the context of foreign
sovereign immunity claims, this generally necessitates that courts look to
the law of the foreign sovereign to determine whether an agent was actually
authorized to take the action in question.299 While this may entail some
level of analysis, the evaluation of statutory text is a less circumstantial
inquiry than asking whether an individual had subjective, reasonable beliefs
concerning the existence of authority.300 The application of actual authority
therefore strikes the proper balance in maintaining the uniformity of
decisions under the FSIA, while maintaining the essence of the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity.301
B. Applying the Equitable Doctrine of Apparent Authority
to Sovereign Debt Disputes Undermines the Maintenance
of Harmonious International Relations
The application of the doctrine of apparent authority also has serious
ramifications for U.S. foreign relations. Courts have long been cognizant of
foreign policy concerns in the context of sovereign immunity claims.302
These very concerns represent yet another fundamental reason for
Congress’s passage of the FSIA.303
The application of apparent authority to foreign sovereign immunity
claims endangers this statutory purpose.
Most generally, the
unpredictability of the doctrine could strain relations with foreign
sovereigns, which would no longer be able to rely on U.S. courts for the
298. See supra Part I.A.2.
299. See, e.g., Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(concluding that the court would evaluate whether the agents in question were vested with
the actual authority by looking to the law of the DRC).
300. See Adam F. Hulbig, Aquamar v. Del Monte Fresh Produce: Expanding the Scope
of Ambassadors’ Rights Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 25 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 597, 618 (2000) (determining that a better rule for regulating the waivers of
sovereign immunity would closely examine local law regulating an Ambassador’s actions);
see also Republic of Benin v. Mezei, No. 06 Civ. 870, 2010 WL 3564270, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 2010) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1) (“Matters of foreign law are questions of law for
the court.”). But cf. Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1298
(11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that looking to the law of foreign sovereigns requires “lengthy,
unpredictable, and frequently inconclusive inquiries” that undercut the utility of the FSIA);
Pittman, supra note 58, at 688 (noting the dangers of “inexperienced courts attempt[ing] to
interpret strange and foreign laws” in sovereign immunity cases).
301. The other side of the spectrum would be the application of the doctrine of inherent
agency power, as was proposed in the dissenting opinion in First Fidelity. 877 F.2d 189,
196–201 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting). This would seem to require that acts of
official government agents, such as Ambassadors, automatically bind sovereigns as long as
those acts are generally within the scope of the position. See id. This Note, however, focuses
on the conflict between the two competing rules adopted by circuits and, thus, does not
deliberate at length on this alternative proposition.
302. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (citing Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423–25 (1964)) (“Actions against foreign
sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations of the United
States, and the primacy of federal concerns is evident.”).
303. See USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 207 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that
the court should remain cognizant of the congressional goal of “avoiding impairing foreign
relations” evidenced in the FSIA); see also supra Part I.B.4.
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uniform adjudication of claims with an implicit guarantee of fair
treatment.304 Moreover, the application of apparent authority spurs
“potentially intrusive and resented inquiries of foreign governments” by
third parties seeking to contract with government officials,305 as well as by
domestic courts.306 This resentment would be magnified where, under the
guise of apparent authority, courts in effect ignore the law of the foreign
sovereign by applying equitable principles.307 Indeed, by requiring more
intensive analysis of sovereign actions, the Second Circuit moves further
from English and Canadian courts, which have been reluctant to interfere or
These unwarranted
undermine foreign sovereign functions.308
investigations, as well as consequent judicial determinations, thus strain
U.S. diplomatic relations309 and intrude on the responsibilities and interests
of the executive and legislative branches.310
These intrusive inquiries would also have practical geopolitical results,
amplifying their impact on U.S. interests abroad. Specifically, they would
spark a chilling effect on the provision of services to foreign nations as third
party vendors become increasingly reluctant to extend credit to sovereigns

304. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606
(“[The FSIA will] assur[e] litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely
legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process.”); see also supra Part I.B.4.
305. First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 199 (Newman, J., dissenting); Michael D. Anderson, First
Fidelity Bank v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989), 14
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 286, 296 (1990) (“[T]he decision may ultimately offend foreign
sovereigns whose diplomatic missions to the United States will have to establish that they
have the authority to act on behalf of their sovereign to complete even the most basic of day
to day transactions.”).
306. See, e.g., Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also
Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 740–41 (noting that these concerns regarding the issuance of
judgments against state officials originally prompted courts to simply refuse to hear cases
implicating sovereign states).
307. See Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Whether a
third party reasonably perceives that the sovereign has empowered its agent to engage in a
transaction, however, is irrelevant if the sovereign’s constitution or laws proscribe or do not
authorize the agent’s conduct and the third party fails to make a proper inquiry.”).
308. Gathii, supra note 133, at 307–08; see also Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 740 (“In
the legal realm it is clear that an adverse judgment entered in the courts of Nation A against
Nation B or its high officials in their sovereign capacity could seriously affect Nation B’s
conduct of internal matters.”).
309. Pittman, supra note 58, at 684; see also Gathii, supra note 133, at 308 (“[T]he
extinction of any regard for the sovereign or regulatory functions of sovereigns in managing
public functions such as refinancing sovereign debt results in an unbalanced projection of the
authority of the United States over coequal sovereigns.”).
310. See Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1298 (11th Cir.
1999) (“A judicial inquiry into a foreign ambassador’s authority to perform traditional
diplomatic functions can infringe upon the authority of our own executive and legislative
branches to manage the foreign relations of the United States.”); see also Jackson v. People’s
Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1495–96 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that the U.S.
government urged the court to refrain from deciding a bond default case implicating China,
based on the country’s understanding of absolute sovereign immunity and its ability to
undertake economic retaliations). But cf. Carolyn J. Brock, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: Defining a Role for the Executive, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 825–26 (1990)
(concluding that the State Department has remained too active in sovereign immunity cases,
contrary to the legislative intent of Congress in passing the FSIA).
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in light of increased litigation uncertainty.311 This reluctance would have
an especially strong impact on those states which can ill afford it, namely
developing nations which already lack sufficient, affordable access to credit
and services.312 Indeed, an increase in debt servicing costs, reflecting
increased litigation volatility, would further destabilize the fragile economic
situation in many of these troubled states.313 This destabilization would not
only be a negative result in practical terms, but would also be contrary to
the wider interest of the United States in maintaining global financial
security.314
C. Sovereign Debt Creditors Do Not Need the Protection
of the Equitable Doctrine of Apparent Authority
This section illustrates that modern sovereign creditors are more than
adequately protected under a sharply circumscribed doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity. Part III.C.1 examines the gradual erosion of the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity and how this has resulted in
increased protections for sovereign creditors. Part III.C.2 bolsters this
argument by examining the practices of sovereign creditors, especially
hedge funds, to conclude that these actors do not require, nor in fact
deserve, the application of an equitable doctrine such as apparent authority.
1. The FSIA’s Circumscription of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Adequately Protects Sovereign Debt Creditors
Modern creditors have already secured significant, and indeed sufficient,
protections through the continued erosion of the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity.315 At the most fundamental level, the FSIA alone
represents a substantial level of protection for creditors via its codification
of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which was designed, in
part, to protect U.S. creditors.316 Moreover, subsequent judicial decisions
interpreting the FSIA, and especially its commercial activity exception,

311. See First Fidelity Bank v. Gov’t of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189, 199 (2d Cir.
1989) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s [opinion] . . . will, I fear, have the
unfortunate consequences of making some vendors unwilling to extend credit for goods and
services.”). It could, however, be argued that the added protections of an equitable doctrine
would actually spur the provision of such services. But this assertion overlooks the fact that
third party vendors will logically shy away from the perceived future costs of litigation
generally, rather than entering into transactions betting on the outcome of future litigation.
312. See Gathii, supra note 133, at 310 (“Debt servicing, however, makes it extremely
difficult for these countries to afford imports to generate growth or development.”).
313. See id. (“Investment in highly indebted countries is particularly risky as reflected by
its highly speculative nature making it hard for indebted economies to benefit from it.”).
314. See Anne Krueger, Should Countries Like Argentina Be Able to Declare Themselves
Bankrupt?, EL PAIS (Jan. 18, 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2002/011802.htm
(“[If] a country’s debts become truly unsustainable, it is in everyone’s interest that the
problem is addressed promptly and in an orderly way.”) [http://perma.cc/7CXQ-HGL3].
315. See Broomfield, supra note 20, at 479–83 (noting the continued erosion of immunity
under the FSIA, especially in relation to defaulting sovereign debtors).
316. See supra Part I.B.3.
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have strengthened this baseline protection, largely by eroding the traditional
immunity defenses available to sovereigns.317
The single greatest example of this doctrinal attrition is the Supreme
Court’s extension of the commercial activity exception to the refinancing of
sovereign debt in Weltover. In holding that the purpose behind a
sovereign’s engagement in commercial bond markets is secondary to the
commercial nature of the action, the Court sanctioned judicial review of an
act which can plainly be seen as public in nature.318 For instance, in
Weltover itself, the Argentine government had only turned to the bond
market to alleviate a grievous foreign exchange shortage brought about by a
domestic credit crisis.319 Thus, Argentina was not entering into commercial
agreements merely to raise extra funds or invest abroad, but instead to
stabilize its domestic economy as a whole, which could quite readily be
viewed as a public act.320
Moreover, lower courts have interpreted the Court’s ruling in Weltover in
an even broader fashion.321 Take, for example, the Second Circuit’s
conclusion that “a breach of a contractual agreement arising from the
exercise of powers peculiar to sovereigns and not exercisable by private
citizens does not immunize a foreign sovereign’s conduct.”322 In effect,
this means “there is no room under New York law to make the point that a
state has an inherent authority as a sovereign to act to safeguard vital
interests even though such acts may modify or abrogate the rights of
creditors under existing contracts.”323
Other traditional protections available to sovereigns have likewise been
eroded during this period. For instance, the scope of the act of state
doctrine, which historically barred judicial review of the lawfulness of a
sovereign’s action within its territory, has been significantly narrowed in
light of an emerging commercial activity exception.324 The principle of
317. See generally Gathii, supra note 133 (discussing the general collapse of sovereign
immunity defenses and its impact on sovereign debt litigation); see also Aaron L. Warren &
Ryan E. Avery, Investors of Prey: Seeking Relief in Distressed Debt Markets, 18 U. MIAMI
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 229–30 (2011) (highlighting that in attempting to define
“commercial activity,” federal courts have chipped away at many traditional aspects of
immunity); Yilin Ding, Absolute, Restrictive, or Something More: Did Beijing Choose the
Right Type of Sovereign Immunity for Hong Kong?, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 997, 1019
(2012) (concluding that the continued erosion of sovereign immunity in creditor-friendly
nations has made it easier for creditors to bring suit).
318. See Gathii, supra note 133, at 307–08; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 9 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 57, 155–56 (2001) (“[It
is] impossible to pin down, depending as it does on the level of specificity at which one
characterizes the act that determines whether it appears to be public or private, sovereign or
commercial.”).
319. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 616–17 (1992).
320. See id.
321. Gathii, supra note 133, at 308.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 308–09.
324. See Joseph B. Frumkin, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults
on United States Bank Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
469, 492 (1985) (“But just as certainly there is a range of governmental acts that might be
characterized as commercial and yet involve serious noncommercial sovereign interests.”).
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comity, which “limit[s] domestic jurisdiction to hear claims or apply
[foreign] law,”325 has likewise been eroded via judicial review.326
Therefore, modern creditors are already adequately protected in the field
of sovereign debt via the continued erosion of the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity. Indeed, some have suggested that the current legal
situation is too favorable to creditors.327 Regardless, the protections offered
under the status quo illustrate that there is no need for imposition of the
equitable doctrine of apparent authority in claims of sovereign immunity.
2. Sovereign Debt Creditors, Particularly Sophisticated Hedge Funds,
Are Sufficiently Capable of Protecting Their Investors
Moreover, modern sovereign creditors are not the sort of disadvantaged
third parties envisioned by the doctrine of apparent authority.328 Certainly,
there are unique risks in dealing with foreign sovereigns, in that the debtor
may simply refuse to make payments on a loan or opportunistically
default.329 But sovereign creditors today include some of the largest, and
most sophisticated, financial and corporate institutions in the world.330 As
sophisticated actors, these investors have the ability to adequately
investigate and weigh the creditworthiness of sovereign debt.331 This
capability, along with their relative economic clout, means that they cannot
plead a lack of bargaining power with highly indebted sovereign states.332
Moreover, on a more basic level, these investors are not involuntary
creditors. They have not been forced against their will into a financial
arrangement, but, rather, have actively and carefully chosen to invest in
certain sovereigns with full knowledge of their financial issues.333 In light
of this assumption of risk,334 it simply does not follow that modern
sovereign creditors need an equitable doctrine, such as apparent authority,
to protect them.
325. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (1991).
326. Gathii, supra note 133, at 307–08; see also Warren, supra note 317, at 232 (noting
that the courts have effectively stripped foreign sovereigns of immunity by denying claims
of comity).
327. See Gathii, supra note 133, at 319 (“New York law is too favorable to creditors.”).
328. See supra Part I.A.2.
329. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 124, at 1048–49. “Opportunistic default” refers to
situations where a debtor is not unable, but only unwilling, to make payments on its debt. Id.
at 1044.
330. See id. at 1070 (“[Sovereign bond holders include] large commercial
banks . . . [,] investment banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, retail
funds, hedge funds, nonfinancial companies, and retail investors.”). But cf. Gathii, supra
note 133, at 267 (discussing the differing motivations of banking institutions, which, as
repeat players, have greater incentives to act in the wider interest of the international
community, and hedge funds, which have little or no pressure to refrain from litigating).
331. See Gathii, supra note 133, at 304.
332. Id.
333. See id. (“These holdouts are not in the position of involuntary lenders unaware of the
fact that sovereign borrowers are often unable to bare the risk of borrowed monies.”).
334. See id. (“[I]t would therefore be reasonable to assume that these holdouts are often
aware of the financial handicaps of sovereign debtors and by buying bonds underwritten by
such indebted sovereigns they are assuming the risk of non-payment.”).
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This conclusion is most clearly supported by the example of vulture
funds. These funds intentionally purchase debt issued by some of the most
financially and politically distressed countries in the world.335 Indeed, they
often target states that are parties to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative (HIPCI), which was founded in 1996 by the World Bank in order
to assist countries with unsustainable levels of foreign debt.336
Moreover, the debt these funds purchase is often already in default,
which explains why it trades at a significant discount from its face value.337
But the funds then bring suit in creditor-friendly nations to enforce the full
value of the defaulted debt, in effect seeking, and many times receiving, a
windfall payment.338 Therefore, it can fairly be said that in targeting
“sovereigns ravaged by civil war, political upheaval, and social chaos,
vulture funds nonetheless enjoy court protection in seeking to gain a
monetary judgment against both their interest and the interest of others
through international markets.”339 It cannot be argued that such actors are
in need of any additional judicial protections, especially those originally
intended to benefit innocent third parties.
D. Themis Capital Illustrates Why the Majority Position Is Superior
The decision in the second Themis case, imposing a roughly $100 million
judgment against the DRC, is illustrative of many of these concerns. The
DRC is readily termed a failed or even nonexistent state.340 The country
has been wracked by civil war for well over twenty years, and it
consistently ranks last or next to last in failed state and development
335. See Warren, supra note 317, at 222–23 (“[V]ulture funds have become notorious for
being litigious against not only distressed nations, but also against some of the poorest and
most unstable economies in the world.”); see also supra Part I.D.3.
336. Broomfield, supra note 20, at 490–91. Specifically, countries within the HIPCI
work toward a completion stage by meeting identifiable financial benchmarks. Id. at 491.
Once this completion stage is reached, the state receives complete and irrevocable debt
relief. Id. However, creditors retain the ability to litigate during this process and may refuse
to cooperate with the HIPCI process. Id. at 492. Countries within the HIPC represent the
lowest echelon of developing states, but, nonetheless, vulture funds have targeted at least
seventeen of them in litigation. Warren, supra note 317, at 225.
337. Warren, supra note 317, at 223.
338. Indeed, these funds have been phenomenally successful, at least in purely financial
terms. In the United Kingdom, vulture fund litigation cases have led to favorable judgments
totaling $236.1 million on debt with a face value of only $65.3 million. Broomfield, supra
note 20, at 504. The returns have been even higher in the United States, with investors
receiving favorable judgments totaling $659.4 million on debt with a face value of $195.9
million. Id. at 507. This figure represents almost 95 percent of claimed damages. Warren,
supra note 317, at 229.
339. Warren, supra note 317, at 225; see also Broomfield, supra note 20, at 492 (“Vulture
creditors therefore pose a special risk to countries undergoing the HIPC
process. . . . Creditor failure to take part in the HIPC Initiative (let alone their decision to
litigate) could result in HIPC countries failing to reach debt sustainability,
undermining . . . their movement toward[] economic prosperity.”).
340. See Jeffrey Herbst & Greg Mills, The Invisible State: It’s Time We Admit the
Democratic Republic of Congo Does Not Exist, FOREIGN POLICY (June 24, 2013), http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/the_invisible_state
[http://perma.cc/DTQ7VU73].
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indices.341 In finding that the DRC was bound to its debt obligations by its
governmental official’s signing of the acknowledgement letter, the court
imposed a weighty financial penalty on this already economically fragile
state to the detriment of both the DRC and its other creditors, but to the
benefit of opportunistic investors.342
Moreover, the court’s findings regarding the existence of apparent
authority were based on arguments that are, at best, colorable in either
direction.343 Specifically, the court determined that it was “eminently
reasonable” for the parties to have believed the signing of the 2003 letter
was legitimate, regardless of DRC law governing the issue.344 But this
conclusion seems to be an almost complete reversal from the first Themis
litigation, where the court specifically noted the inherently suspicious
circumstances of a situation in which, on “behalf of a cash-poor country,
[government officials] renewed a financial obligation, now totaling
approximately $80 million, against which claims were long barred by the
statute of limitations, and evidently for no consideration whatsoever.”345
The court also blithely ignored the duty of creditors to investigate any such
suspicious situation under the duty of inquiry.346
E. Remedial Propositions
Therefore, the Second Circuit’s rule requiring the application of the
doctrine of apparent authority should be expressly rejected. Because the
split in authority essentially derives from a statutory provision of the
FSIA,347 and because the legislative branch has a vested interest in
regulating sovereign immunity cases,348 Congress itself should enact a
statutory revision of the commercial activity exception to reflect a rejection
of apparent authority. In the alternative, however, considering the risk of
congressional inaction or legislative capture, the Supreme Court should be
prepared to grant certiorari and endorse the majority view as elucidated by

341. Id.
342. See supra Part I.D.4.
343. See supra Part I.D.4. Indeed, it is also arguable that the court’s decision in regard to
actual authority was similarly questionable. Specifically, the court interpreted DRC law to
require the approval of the entire cabinet of ministers only where there were “budgetary
repercussions” to an action. See supra Part I.D.4. The court then held that the signing of the
acknowledgement letter had no budgetary repercussions and that, therefore, cabinet approval
was not required. See supra Part I.D.4. Not only does the court’s interpretation of DRC law
itself seem conclusory, but the court’s holding also entirely ignores that the signing of the
2003 acknowledgement letter left the DRC on the hook for $100 million. If that cannot be
said to be a “budgetary repercussion,” then the author would question what could or would
fit the court’s definition.
344. Themis Capital II, 35 F. Supp. 3d 457, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also supra Part
I.D.4.
345. See supra Part I.D.4.
346. See supra Part I.D.4.
347. See supra Part II.B.1–3.
348. See supra note 310.
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the Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth circuits, expressly overruling the Second
Circuit’s application of apparent authority as laid out in First Fidelity.349
CONCLUSION
While Loydstone Jacobs’s Antiguan-casino venture may be long past, the
circuit split regarding the application of agency principles to claims of
foreign sovereign immunity remains in force. The Second Circuit continues
to adhere to the minority view as elucidated in First Fidelity, which holds
that apparent authority is sufficient to bind a sovereign to a transaction for
the purposes of the commercial activity exception. The Ninth, Fifth, and
Fourth Circuits, however, steadfastly hold that only actual authority is
sufficient to bind a sovereign.
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the minority rule
requiring the application of the doctrine of apparent authority to claims of
foreign sovereign immunity should be rejected, at least in the context of
sovereign debt disputes. This is primarily because of the troubling doctrinal
implications entailed in its utilization—that it would result in increased
unpredictability of decisions, as well as imperil U.S. foreign relations.350
But secondary concerns likewise push against endorsing the minority
position. Most modern sovereign creditors are already adequately protected
via the current, eroded doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.351
Moreover, these same creditors are sophisticated investors, who have
knowingly assumed the risk of investing in sovereign states—and often
troubled ones at that.352 Therefore, they do not require the protection of an
equitable doctrine, which was originally intended to assist disadvantaged
third parties.353
In sum, Congress should revise the FSIA to explicitly disavow the
minority position in this context. If, however, Congress proves unable or
unwilling to act, the Supreme Court itself should overrule the minority
view.

349. See generally First Fidelity Bank v. Gov’t of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189 (2d
Cir. 1989).
350. See supra Part III.A–B.
351. See supra Part III.C.1.
352. See supra Part III.C.2.
353. See supra Part I.A.2.

